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YOU’RE ONLY AS GOOD AS YOUR TAX SOFTWARE: THE TAX
COURT’S WRONGFUL APPROVAL OF THE TURBOTAX
DEFENSE IN OLSEN V. COMMISSIONER
Kacey Marr

I. INTRODUCTION
In November 2011, the United States Tax Court disallowed the
imposition of accuracy-related penalties on taxpayer Kurt Olsen who
made an input error on his federal income tax return while using tax
preparation software.1 Only seven pages long and carrying no
precedential value, the summary opinion seemed as innocuous as any
other tax case.2 However, the opinion quickly created a stir among tax
experts.3
Kurt Olsen was the first taxpayer to successfully argue the so-called
“TurboTax Defense” to the Tax Court.4 The thrust of the defense is that
tax penalties should be excused if tax reporting mistakes are caused by
the tax preparation software.5 It has also been referred to as the
“Geithner Defense” after US Department of Treasury Secretary Tim
Geithner implied during his confirmation hearing that he was relieved
from accuracy-related penalties, at least partially, because his tax return
mistakes were caused by TurboTax.6
After Geithner publicly blamed the software, many taxpayers who
had been assessed accuracy-related penalties by the Internal Revenue
 Associate Member, 2011–12 University of Cincinnati Law Review.
1. Olsen v. Comm’r, T.C. Summ.Op. 2011-131, 7 (2011). Olsen and his wife filed joint federal
income tax returns, but Olsen “usually takes the lead in preparing” returns, as was the case for the return
at issue. Id. at 3.
2. Id.
3. See, e.g., Laura Saunders, Tax Court Approves ‘Geithner Defense’ Surprising Experts, WALL
STREET ST. JOURNAL TOTAL RETURN (Nov. 25, 2011), http://blogs.wsj.com/totalreturn/2011/ 11/25/taxcourt-approves-geithner-defense-surprising-experts/ [hereinafter Surprising Experts] (“The case has
caught the eye of tax experts, as in several other cases the Court has turned a deaf ear to taxpayer pleas
for penalty abeyance due to mistakes made while using tax-prep software.”).
4. Olsen, T.C. Summ.Op. at 7 (holding that Olsen is not liable to the accuracy-related penalty
under I.R.C. § 6662(a) for his data entry error that prevented the tax preparation software from reporting
a source of income properly).
5. See, e.g., Paul L. Caron, For First Time, Tax Court Approves Use of Geithner/Turbo Tax
Defense, TAXPROF BLOG (Nov. 25, 2011), http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2011/11/for-firsttime.html [hereinafter For First Time] (“[T]axpayer’s use of the Geithner/TurboTax Defense . . . to
blame mistakes in his use of tax preparation software to excuse him for penalties for failing to report
income on his return.”).
6. See Peter Pappas, Geithner Tax Defense Doesn’t Work for the Small People, TAX LAW.
BLOG (June 23, 2010), http://www.pappasontaxes.com/index.php/2010/06/23/geithner-defense-doesntwork-for-the-small-people/ (“Geithner was . . . relieved of the penalties based, at least in part, on his
contention that his tax software, TurboTax, screwed up.”).
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Service (IRS) decided to test the TurboTax Defense in the Tax Court,
and for a time, all were rejected.7 Tax and accounting experts became
used to, and even amused by, the Tax Court’s unwillingness to accept
the defense after Geithner’s admission.8 Thus, when Olsen successfully
used the defense, experts erupted with shock and criticism.9
This criticism is not unfounded. The Tax Court improperly allowed
Olsen to use the TurboTax Defense, not just because it went against
precedent, but also because the defense did not fit the facts of the case
and because the Tax Court could have reached the same result with
other, more viable options. Part II of this Note investigates the rise of
the TurboTax Defense; specifically, the catalyst effect of Geithner’s
testimony on the defense strategies of taxpayers who had similarly used,
and misused, tax preparation software. Part III discusses circumstances
under which the Tax Court allowed the defense in Olsen v.
Commissioner, as well as the media aftermath. Part IV will discuss the
correctness of the Olsen decision and compare the allowance of the
TurboTax Defense with other, more fitting alternatives, including the
appropriateness of imposing the penalties assessed by the IRS.
This Note argues that the Olsen decision was not properly based on
the TurboTax Defense, both because of the facts and because of recent
precedent. If the Tax Court wanted to avoid penalizing the taxpayer, it
could have reached the same result through other, less controversial
7. See, e.g., Anyika v. Comm’r, 101 T.C.M. (CCH) 1322 (2011); Parker v. Comm’r, T.C.
Summ.Op. 2010-78 (2010); Lam v. Comm’r, 99 T.C.M. 2010-82 (2010). See also Paul L. Caron,
Geithner Blames Turbo Tax for His Tax Troubles, TAXPROF BLOG (Jan. 22, 2009),
http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2009/01/geithner-blames-.html [hereinafter Geithner Blames]
(“Timothy Geithner implied at his confirmation hearing that the mistakes in his tax returns were caused
by his use of the TurboTax software program.”); Paul L. Caron, Tax Court Rejects Taxpayer’s Attempt
to
Use
Geithner’s
TurboTax
Defense,
TAXPROF
BLOG
(Aug.
26,
2009),
http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2009/08/tax-court-rejects.html (“The Tax Court yesterday
rejected a taxpayer’s attempt to use the TurboTax defense successfully employed by Treasury Secretary
Timothy Geithner.”); Paul L. Caron, Tax Court Again Rejects Geithner/ TurboTax Defense, TAXPROF
BLOG, Nov. 12, 2010, http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/ 2010/11/tax-court.html (“The Tax Court
yesterday again rejected . . . use of the “Geithner defense”).
8. See, e.g., Caleb Newquist, For the Last Time, Only Tim Geithner Can Blame TurboTax and
Get Away with It, GOING CONCERN (June 23, 2010), http://goingconcern.com/2010/6/for-the-last-timeonly-tim-geithner-can-blame-turbotax-and-get-away-with-it [hereinafter For the Last Time] (“If you are
a not a well-connected bureaucrat with a fabulous coif, you are not afforded the same privileges as
[those] who are/do.”); Ashby Jones, Tax Court: If You’re Gonna Use TurboTax, Use it Correctly, WALL
ST. J. (Apr. 20, 2010), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2010/04/20/tax-court-if-youre-gonna-use-turbotax-useit-correctly/ [hereinafter Use it Correctly] (“In other words, it’s not enough to blame TurboTax. You’ve
got to make sure you’re using TurboTax correctly.”).
9. See, e.g., Robert W. Wood, No More Laughing at TurboTax Defense, FORBES (Dec. 8,
2011),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2011/12/08/no-more-laughing-at-turbotax-defense/
[hereinafter No More Laughing] (“I thought the TurboTax Defense was silly, but no more. Now that the
Tax Court embraced it in Olsen v. Commissioner, it looks downright legitimate.”); Surprising Experts,
supra note 3 (“The case has caught the eye of tax experts, as in several other cases the Court has turned
a deaf ear to taxpayer pleas for penalty abeyance due to mistakes made while using tax-prep software.”).
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means. However, this Note ultimately concludes that the Tax Court
should have imposed penalties, which would have been congruent with
precedent and would have avoided further expanding and complicating
tax jurisprudence.
II. BACKGROUND
Beginning in 2009, taxpayers who were assessed accuracy-related
penalties by the IRS due to underpayment on taxes found a creative new
way to defend their mistakes—namely, by blaming it on their tax
preparation software.10 The catalyst behind the so-called TurboTax
Defense was U.S. Department of Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner,
who had understated his tax liabilities by approximately $50,000 over a
five year period. The IRS relieved Geithner of accuracy-related
penalties, at least in part, because of his claim that the mistakes were
caused by his TurboTax software.11
A. The Rise of the “Geithner Defense”
On January 26, 2009, Timothy Geithner was sworn in as the 75th
Secretary of the U.S. Department of the Treasury.12 Prior to taking
office, his nomination came under fire when it was discovered that he
had made certain errors in his past tax returns, which were considered
serious offenses and could have potentially disqualified him13 from
serving as the head of the government body responsible for, inter alia,
collecting taxes, enforcing tax laws, and prosecuting tax evaders.14
The Senate Finance Committee released a memorandum documenting
Geithner’s tax troubles.15 For the taxable years between 2001 and 2006,
Geithner made several errors that resulted in tax adjustments totaling
around $50,000.16 The most significant tax concern involved his failure
to pay social security taxes during his employment at the International
10. See Anyika, 101 T.C.M. at 6; Parker, T.C. Summ.Op. 2010-78; Lam, 99 T.C.M. 2010-82.
11. Pappas, supra note 6 (“Geithner was . . . relieved of the penalties based, at least in part, on
his contention that his tax software, TurboTax, screwed up.”).
12. About the Secretary, U.S. DEPARTMENT TREASURY (Oct. 28 2012, 10:22 AM),
http://www.treasury.gov/about/Pages/Secretary.aspx.
13. Jonathan Weisman, Geithner’s Tax History Muddles Confirmation, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 14,
2009), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123187503629378119.html [hereinafter Muddles Confirmation].
14. Duties and Functions of the U.S. Department of the Treasury, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE
TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov/about/role-of-treasury/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Sept. 26,
2012).
15. Carol Guthrie & Jill Kozeny, Comment Regarding Treasury Nominee Geithner, U.S. SENATE
COMMITTEE ON FINANCE (Jan. 13, 2009), available at http://www.finance.senate.gov/newsroom/
chairman/release/?id=f4382cc9-6fb9-4e2e-90a4-46b3b4caa16d.
16. Id. at 1.
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Monetary Fund (IMF).17
As an international organization, the IMF is exempted from the
Federal Insurance Contributions Act and therefore does not pay the
employer share of social security taxes.18 Thus, IMF employees who
are U.S. citizens must pay self-employment taxes with respect to
compensation.19 To further this end, the IMF provides its employees
with documents to help employees understand and meet their federal,
state, and self-employment tax obligations.20 Despite having received
all of these documents, and despite his past experience with social
security tax issues, Geithner failed to pay social security and selfemployment taxes from 2001 to 2004, with the deficiencies totaling
$42,702.21
Geithner agreed to IRS adjustments for the taxable years 2003 and
2004, and Geithner voluntarily submitted payments for 2001 and 2002
resulting from his failure to pay the self-employment taxes.22 The IRS
then waived the accuracy-related penalties.23 He was relieved of these
penalties, at least in part, because of his contention that TurboTax was to
blame.24
After Geithner’s confirmation hearing, where he publicly implied that
the mistakes in his tax returns were caused by tax preparation software,
tax experts were quick to debunk the possibility that the mistakes were
caused by TurboTax.25 Paul Caron, Pepperdine University School of
Law professor and popular tax blogger,26 said that “TurboTax (and any
other leading software program) easily calculates self-employment
tax.”27 Likewise, Jim Lindgren, a law professor at Northwestern
University Law School,28 conclusively demonstrated that Geithner’s
17. See id. at 2.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1, 3. Geithner began working for IMF in 2001 and concluded his work there in 2003,
with some of his compensation being paid in 2004. Id. at 2. Therefore, he failed to meet his tax
obligations during his entire tenure at IMF. Id.; see also Muddles Confirmation, supra note 13 (IRS
concluded Geithner owed taxes for 2003 and 2004 totaling $17,230 and the Obama transition team
discovered Geithner owed $25,970 from 2001 and 2002).
22. Muddles Confirmation, supra note 13.
23. Id.
24. Pappas, supra note 6.
25. See Geithner Blames, supra note 7 (“Of course, as any tax professional knows, TurboTax
(and any of the other leading software programs) easily calculates self-employment tax.”).
26. See
Paul
L.
Caron,
PEPPERDINE
UNIV.
SCHOOL
OF
LAW,
http://law.pepperdine.edu/academics/faculty/default.php?faculty=paul_caron (May 6, 2013, 2:40 PM);
see also Molly McDonough, The 5th Annual ABA Journal Blawg 100, ABA J., Dec. 1, 2011,
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/the_5th_annual_aba_ journal_blawg_100.
27. Geithner Blames, supra note 7.
28. See Faculty Profiles: James T. Lindgren, NW. U. L. SCHOOL, http://www.law.northwestern.
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self-employment tax error would have been discovered by an interactive
prompt in the 2004 version of TurboTax software.29
B. Early Cases Using the TurboTax Defense
After the publicity surrounding Geithner’s TurboTax claim, and
Geithner’s ability to ward off accuracy-related penalties at least partly
because of it, taxpayers facing penalties for understating income on their
federal income tax returns started testing the TurboTax Defense in front
of the Tax Court.30 Each case was met with substantially the same
answer: “[T]he misuse of tax preparation software, even if unintentional
or accidental, is no defense to penalties . . . .”31
In Lam v. Commissioner, the taxpayer explicitly analogized her
situation to that of Geithner to defend against accuracy-related penalties
assessed by the IRS.32 When Ms. Lam used TurboTax for her income
tax returns, she improperly combined losses from her real estate
business with unrelated losses.33 The IRS disallowed the reported rental
losses, re-characterized other losses, and then determined that Ms. Lam
was liable for accuracy-related penalties.34 The IRS argued that
penalties were warranted because Ms. Lam did not behave reasonably
since she did not seek the help of a tax professional, consult with the
IRS, visit the IRS website, or read any instructions on how to properly
report her losses.35 Ms. Lam focused on the similarities between hers
and Geithner’s situation and argued that she acted with reasonable cause
because the mistakes were made using TurboTax.36 She cited a
Wikipedia article about Geithner’s tax troubles to argue that her use of
TurboTax resulted in mistakes on her taxes.37 The Tax Court briefly
dismissed this argument, noting that it was not a flaw in the TurboTax
software that caused Ms. Lam’s errors, and that her misuse of the
software, even though not purposeful, was no defense to the penalties.38
In a case decided just eight months prior to the Olsen decision, the

edu/faculty/profiles/jameslindgren/ (Oct. 28, 2012, 10:44 AM).
29. Geithner Blames, supra note 7.
30. See Anyika v. Comm’r, 101 T.C.M. (CCH) 1322 (2011); Parker v. Comm’r, T.C. Summ.Op.
2010-78 (2010); Lam v. Comm’r, 99 T.C.M. 2010-82 (2010).
31. Anyika, 101 T.C.M. at 6; see also Lam, 99 T.C.M. at 3.
32. Lam, 99 T.C.M. at 3.
33. Id. at 1.
34. See id.
35. Id. at 3.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
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Tax Court again rejected the taxpayer’s use of the TurboTax Defense.39
In Anyika v. Commissioner, the Anyikas used TurboTax software to
prepare their joint tax return and claimed deductions for managing rental
properties.40 They did not consult tax professionals to find out whether
or not the deductions were proper.41 The IRS disallowed the deductions
and assessed penalties.42 The Tax Court noted that an exception to the
imposition of penalties applied if the taxpayer could demonstrate
reasonable cause and good faith by showing their efforts to assess
proper tax liability, or by showing that they misunderstood a fact or the
law in a manner that was reasonable for a taxpayer of similar
experience, knowledge, and education.43 The Anyikas sought to prove
the exception applied because the software was responsible for the
miscalculations; however, they never provided any evidence to
substantiate that claim.44 The Tax Court dismissed the TurboTax
Defense and assessed penalties, again holding that the misuse of tax
preparation software, whether purposeful or not, was not a defense
against penalties.45
Tax experts were intrigued by these results, as well as the many other
attempts made by taxpayers to use the TurboTax Defense.46 News and
blog articles even began to joke about the taxpayer who dared to blame
TurboTax for their reporting mistakes.47 Despite the humor of all the
failed attempts, tax experts recognized that Tim Geithner’s ability to
successfully use the excuse was now incongruent with Tax Court
holdings.48
One case in particular seemed to spark the most controversy in the
blogosphere. In Parker v. Commissioner, taxpayer Parker fought
accuracy-related penalties on facts strikingly similar to Tim Geithner’s
situation.49 Starting in 2005, Parker, like Geithner, worked for the IMF,
which did not withhold federal income tax or social security tax, and
therefore obligated Parker to pay self-employment tax.50 Parker, like

39. Anyika v. Comm’r, 101 T.C.M. (CCH) 1322, 6 (2011).
40. Id. at 1.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 6.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See, e.g., For the Last Time, supra note 8.
47. See, e.g., Use it Correctly, supra note 8 (“In other words, it’s not enough to blame TurboTax.
You’ve got to make sure you’re using TurboTax correctly.”).
48. See, e.g., For the Last Time, supra note 8 (“If you are a not a well-connected bureaucrat with
a fabulous coif, you are not afforded the same privileges as [those] who are/do.”).
49. Parker v. Comm’r, T.C. Summ.Op. 2010-78 (2010).
50. Id. at 1–2.
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Geithner, used TurboTax software to prepare his return, and, like
Geithner, failed to pay self-employment tax.51 He claimed that
“TurboTax had provided erroneous information . . . to wit, that the
social security taxes were included in [his] taxes due.”52
The Tax Court agreed with the IRS and assessed the accuracy-related
penalties.53 In a controversial footnote, the Tax Court addressed
Parker’s contention that “the IRS granted ‘favorable treatment’ in a case
involving US Secretary of the Treasury Timothy Geithner” and that
“there should not be different[ ] or favorable rules for the wellconnected.”54 The Tax Court said that the facts of Parker’s case were
not relevant to Geithner’s case and that, even if the facts were relevant,
it would still be irrelevant to the holding because Parker was “required
to establish on the basis of the facts and circumstances . . . in his own
case” that the accuracy-related penalties should not be assessed.55
Joe Kristan, tax technical director for Roth & Company and writer of
TaxUpdate Blog, analogized the Parker decision to a tax law
experiment.56 Kristan said the hypothesis was that Geithner got “a
special deal because he’s a big shot” and that the “scientists at the Tax
Court . . . validated this hypothesis.”57 He summarized the Tax Court’s
holding as saying that the accuracy-related penalties “are for little
people.”58 Editor of Going Concern Caleb Newquist, in pointing out
that the Tax Court had again debunked a “likeness between a regular
schmo” and Geithner, said that “[i]f you are not a well-connected
bureaucrat with a fabulous coif, you are not afforded the same privileges
as [those] who are/do.”59 Tax attorney and certified public accountant
(CPA) Peter Pappas wrote in his blog that he did not necessarily
disagree with the Parker decision, but that he thought “Geithner,
especially because of his sophistication in financial matters, should have
had to pay the penalty as well.”60
III. OLSEN V. COMMISSIONER
Despite many failed attempts by other taxpayers to employ the
51. Id. at 2.
52. Id. at 4.
53. Id. at 7.
54. Id. at 7 n.15.
55. Id.
56. Joe Kristan, The Geithner Rule Only Applies to Geithner, TAX UPDATE BLOG (June 22,
2010), http://www.rothcpa.com/archives/006107.php.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. For the Last Time, supra note 8.
60. Pappas, supra note 6.
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TurboTax Defense after Tim Geithner,61 taxpayer Kurt Olsen decided to
try his hand at it in November 2011.62 Unexpectedly, Special Trial
Judge Robert Armend ruled in favor of Olsen and accepted the defense
for the first time, surprising tax experts, bloggers, and journalists.63
A. The Tax Court’s Summary Opinion
Kurt Olsen, a patent attorney for the Department of Energy, was
accustomed to preparing his tax returns using tax preparation software.64
In 2007, Olsen’s wife received interest income from a trust, along with a
Schedule K-1 for reporting the interest income.65 The Olsens were
unfamiliar with reporting procedures because they had never received a
Schedule K-1.66 In an attempt to ensure proper treatment of the interest
income, Olsen upgraded his tax preparation software to a more
“sophisticated” version and used it to prepare the couple’s joint income
tax return.67
While transcribing the trust information, Olsen made a data entry
error that prevented the interest income from being correctly displayed
on his federal tax return.68 He reviewed the return using the software’s
verification features, but he did not discover his error.69 The
Commissioner determined a deficiency in Olsen’s federal income tax of
$9,297 and assessed an accuracy-related penalty of $1,859.70
On these facts, the Tax Court turned to whether Olsen was liable for
the accuracy-related penalty, ultimately finding he was not.71 Under the
Internal Revenue Code (Code), a penalty of 20 percent is imposed on
the amount of underpayment that is attributable to a “substantial
understatement of income tax.”72 An understatement, or the tax
assessed, is substantial if it exceeds the greater of 10 percent of the tax
required or $5,000.73 The Commissioner determined that the Olsens
understated their taxes by over $9,000 and, therefore, could be assessed
61. See infra Part II(B).
62. Olsen v. Comm’r, T.C. Summ.Op. 2011-131 (2011).
63. See, e.g., Surprising Experts, supra note 3.
64. Olsen, T.C. Summ.Op. at 2–3 (noting Olsen “usually takes the lead in preparing the couple’s
joint [f]ederal income tax returns.”).
65. Id. at 2. A Schedule K-1 (Form 1065) is used for reporting “Beneficiary’s Share of Income,
Deductions, Credits, etc.” on federal income tax returns. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 3.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 2.
71. Id. at 2.
72. I.R.C. § 6662(a)&(b)(2) (2012); Olsen, T.C. Summ.Op. at 3.
73. I.R.C. § 6662(d)(1)(A) (2012); Olsen, T.C. Summ.Op. at 3–4.
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an accuracy-related penalty.74 The Tax Court determined that the
Commissioner had carried its burden and proven that Olsen’s
understatement was substantial and that a penalty assessment would be
otherwise proper.75
However, the Tax Court noted that an exception to the imposition of
an accuracy-related penalty would apply if Olsen could establish
reasonable cause for the understatement and also demonstrate that he
acted in good faith by, for example, showing the extent of his effort to
assess the proper tax liability in preparing his return.76 Although it
acknowledged that tax preparation software is only as good as the
preparer’s ability to input the information, the Tax Court held that an
isolated transcription error is not inconsistent with a finding of
reasonable cause and good faith.77
The Tax Court then determined that Olsen had acted reasonably and
in good faith.78 As evidence, the Tax Court noted that this was the sole
error, that he had never received a Schedule K-1, and that he upgraded
his tax preparation software to a more sophisticated version in an
attempt to properly report the unfamiliar income and then checked his
work.79 The Tax Court also noted that, because Olsen worked for the
federal government and held a security clearance subjecting him to
periodic background checks, he would have “substantial motivation” to
properly report income on his tax returns.80 Given these facts, the Tax
Court held that Olsen had acted with reasonable cause and in good faith
and was therefore not liable for the accuracy-related penalty.81
B. Media and Expert Criticisms
Just days after the Olsen decision was released, bloggers and
newspapers reacted to the news that the Tax Court had, for the first time,
accepted the TurboTax Defense.82 Forbes contributor Robert Wood
said, “I thought the TurboTax Defense was silly, but no more. Now that
the Tax Court embraced it . . . it looks downright legitimate.”83 But
experts quickly pointed out flaws in the summary opinion.
74. Olsen, T.C. Summ.Op. at 2.
75. Id. at 5.
76. I.R.C. § 6664(c)(1) (2012); Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(a) (2012); Olsen, T.C. Summ.Op. at 4.
77. Olsen, T.C. Summ.Op. at 5–6.
78. Id. at 7.
79. Id. at 6–7.
80. Id. at 6 n.4.
81. Id. at 7.
82. See, e.g., For First Time, supra note 5 (“The Tax Court . . . for perhaps the first time
accepted a taxpayer’s use of the Geithner/TurboTax defense.”).
83. No More Laughing, supra note 9.
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One point raised was that the opinion, although without precedential
value, opened the floodgates for many other taxpayers who did an inept
job at accounting for their taxes using preparation software.84 CPA Jay
Starkman disagreed with the judgment, saying that “[s]uch mistakes
happen all the time, and they are easy to make. We’re likely to see more
of these cases.”85 Wood argued that Olsen’s defense was not even a true
TurboTax Defense, pointing out that the error was Olsen’s, not the tax
software’s.86 If it had been a true software error, Wood argued, Olsen’s
penalty relief claims would have been even better.87
Readers commenting on the experts’ articles and blogs were also
quick to poke holes in the Olsen decision. One observer argued that,
despite the Tax Court’s finding, Olsen did not make his best effort,
saying that “[e]xperienced preparers know that simply using the
verification procedure to validate one’s data entry is insufficient due
diligence.”88 Another questioned Olsen’s judgment in not seeking
professional advice, saying “[w]hat would [patent attorney Olsen] think
of a novice trying to defend a patent matter?”89
IV. DISCUSSION
The Olsen decision came as a surprise to the tax community for
several reasons. Not only did it contradict a line of Tax Court cases that
explicitly disallowed the TurboTax Defense,90 but it appeared to do so
under a set of facts that did not accurately fit the defense,91 potentially
opening the doors for an overwhelming amount of litigation.92 The Tax
Court’s holding leaves behind a number of unanswered questions,
including: Why apply the defense when the facts of the case do not
match the argument? Why create a new defense when tax jurisprudence
already offers justification for not imposing the accuracy-related
penalties? And, perhaps most importantly, why not just hold Olsen
liable for the penalties?
Subpart A addresses the correctness of the Olsen holding, arguing

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

See Surprising Experts, supra note 3.
Id.
No More Laughing, supra note 9.
Id.
See Michael Cohn, Tax Court Rules in Favor of TurboTax Defense, ACCT. TODAY (Nov. 29,
2011),
http://www.accountingtoday.com/news/Tax-Court-Rules-Favor-TurboTax-Defense-608931.html [hereinafter Tax Court Rules in Favor].
89. Id.
90. See infra Part II(B), Part IV(A)(2), Part IV(B)(3).
91. See infra Part IV(A)(1).
92. See Surprising Experts, supra note 3 (“Such mistakes happen all the time, and they are easy
to make. We’re likely to see more of these cases.”).
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that the approval of the TurboTax Defense was based on facts that do
not appropriately match the law created, and that the Tax Court should
have followed precedent because the arguments for rejecting the
TurboTax Defense in earlier decisions apply with equal, if not greater,
strength to the Olsen case. Subpart B addresses the alternatives that
were available to the Tax Court. First, if the Tax Court wanted to avoid
penalizing the taxpayer, the Tax Court could have relied solely on
Olsen’s reasonable cause and good faith, without reference to his use of
tax preparation software. Second, the Tax Court could have extended
the reliance on professional advice exception to include the TurboTax
Defense on the premise that tax preparation software is a “professional”
providing advice. Third, and most importantly, the Tax Court could
have, and should have, found Olsen liable for accuracy-related penalties
because the force of recent precedent properly disallows the TurboTax
Defense on facts similar to those in the Olsen case.
A. Correctness of the Olsen Holding
The reasoning of previous Tax Court holdings rejecting the TurboTax
Defense, as well as the criticisms of tax experts, journalists, and general
observers, raises valid arguments that bring into question the correctness
of the Olsen summary opinion.93 In particular, the allowance of the
TurboTax Defense on a set of facts that did not fit the mold of the
argument brings into question the Tax Court’s judgment.94 Likewise,
the Tax Court’s decision to disallow penalties designed to reprimand
taxpayers who make mistakes cuts directly against the reasoning used in
recent precedential holdings.95
1. “Bad Facts Make Bad Law”96
The thrust of the TurboTax Defense is that tax penalties should be
93. See infra Part III.
94. See No More Laughing, supra note 9 (“If the software had made the error based on Olsen’s
proper input, his penalty relief claims would be even better. But Olsen made the mistake, not the
software.”) (emphasis omitted).
95. See, e.g., Anyika v. Comm’r, 101 T.C.M. (CCH) 1322 (2011); Parker v. Comm’r, T.C.
Summ.Op. 2010-78 (2010); Lam v. Comm’r, 99 T.C.M. 2010-82 (2010).
96. The legal community often uses this phrase to indicate that, in some instances, a court will
create new precedent based on a case with facts that are not appropriate to the new law created. See,
e.g., John Tredennick, Bad Facts Make Bad Law: ‘Mt. Hawley’ A Step Backward for Rule 502(b),
CATALYST (July 6, 2010), http://www.catalystsecure.com/blog/2010/07/bad-facts-make-bad-law-mthawley-a-step-backward-for-rule-502b/ (“In law school, we learned the old adage that bad facts often
make bad law. What it means is that judges are human. When presented with compelling
circumstances . . . judges sometimes get creative with the law. In an effort to do justice, they make rules
and interpret things in ways that don’t always make sense for later cases.”).
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excused if tax reporting mistakes are caused by the tax preparation
software.97 However, Olsen’s tax errors were not caused by the
software, but rather by a data entry error—a human error.98
As at least one expert has pointed out, the Olsen decision did not
apply the true TurboTax Defense since Olsen himself made the error,
and not his software.99 As the legal platitude goes, “bad facts make bad
law.”100 If the Tax Court wanted to approve the TurboTax Defense, it
should have waited to do so in a case where a taxpayer could prove that
the tax return errors were actually caused by a flaw in tax preparation
software and not by user error.
2. Stare Decisis101
Over the last few years since Geithner publicly implied that his tax
return errors were caused by tax preparation software,102 the Tax Court
has created a line of precedent explicitly disallowing the TurboTax
Defense as a means of avoiding accuracy-related penalties.103 As
discussed further in Part IV(B)(3), the Olsen Court should have
followed precedent and imposed accuracy-related penalties.
In its previous decisions, the Tax Court found that taxpayers had not
acted with reasonable cause and in good faith104 for various reasons—
they had not consulted tax professionals when faced with complex tax
issues,105 they did not use the IRS website for guidance,106 or they
should have known their taxes were not properly reported after
reviewing their returns.107 The Tax Court should have applied this
reasoning to the facts of Olsen because Olsen knew he had never dealt
with the type of income he misreported,108 did not use a tax
97. See, e.g., For First Time, supra note 5 (“[T]axpayer’s use of the Geithner/TurboTax
defense . . . to blame mistakes in his use of tax preparation software to excuse him for penalties for
failing to report income on his return.”).
98. See Olsen v. Comm’r, T.C. Summ.Op. 2011-131, 3 (2011).
99. See No More Laughing, supra note 9 (“[T]his was Olsen’s error, not the tax software’s.”)
(emphasis omitted).
100. See Tredennick, supra note 96.
101. Stare decisis is a legal “doctrine or policy of following rules or principles laid down in
previous judicial decisions unless they contravene the ordinary principles of justice.” Stare Decisis,
MERRIAM–WEBSTER, available at http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ stare%20decisis.
102. See, e.g., Geithner Blames, supra note 7 (“Timothy Geithner implied at his confirmation
hearing that the mistakes in his tax returns were caused by his use of the TurboTax software program.”).
103. See, e.g., Anyika v. Comm’r, 101 T.C.M. (CCH) 1322 (2011); Parker v. Comm’r, T.C.
Summ.Op. 2010-78 (2010); Lam v. Comm’r, 99 T.C.M. 2010-82 (2010).
104. See I.R.C. § 6664(c)(1) (2012).
105. See Lam, 99 T.C.M. at 3; Anyika, 101 T.C.M. at 5.
106. Lam, 99 T.C.M. at 3.
107. See Parker, T.C. Summ.Op. at 7.
108. Olsen v. Comm’r, T.C. Summ.Op. 2011-131, 2 (2010).
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professional,109 and, after reviewing his tax return, did not notice that
the income was not listed.110
B. The Tax Court’s Alternatives
The Olsen decision marked the first time that the Tax Court approved
the TurboTax Defense, thereby opening the doors for a slew of litigation
using this once-defunct excuse.111 Before accepting the taxpayer’s
proposed rule of law, the Tax Court could have explored alternative
courses of action.
As the summary opinion appears to rest on the good faith exception
of § 6664(c)(1) of the Code,112 the Tax Court could have chosen to leave
out the TurboTax language and relied solely on Olsen’s reasonable
cause and good faith. Or, the Tax Court could have accepted the
TurboTax Defense as an extension of the already well-accepted reliance
on professional advice exception,113 treating TurboTax as the
professional providing advice.
Despite alternatives available to avoid penalizing the taxpayer, the
Tax Court should have abandoned its desire to find that Olsen was not
liable for the accuracy-related penalties and followed the recent
precedent of disallowing the TurboTax Defense,114 thereby avoiding the
expert backlash115 as well as the potential for future meritless claims.116
1. Good Faith Exception of § 6664(c)(1)
The Tax Court in Olsen concluded that Olsen was not liable for
accuracy-related penalties because he acted in accordance with the
reasonable cause exception for underpayments.117 Section 6664(c)(1) of
109. See id. at 3.
110. Id. at 7.
111. See, e.g., Surprising Experts, supra note 3 (“Such mistakes happen all the time, and they are
easy to make. We’re likely to see more of these cases.”).
112. The reasonable cause exception for underpayments states that “[n]o penalty shall be imposed
under Section 6662 or 6663 with respect to any portion of an underpayment if it is shown that there was
a reasonable cause for such portion and that the taxpayer acted in good faith with respect to such
portion.” I.R.C. § 6664(c)(1) (2012) (emphasis added).
113. The treasury regulations state that “[r]eliance on an information return, professional advice,
or other facts . . . constitutes reasonable cause and good faith if, under all the circumstances, such
reliance was reasonable and the taxpayer acted in good faith.” Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(b)(1) (2012)
(emphasis added).
114. See, e.g., Anyika v. Comm’r, 101 T.C.M. (CCH) 1322 (2011); Parker v. Comm’r, T.C.
Summ.Op. 2010-78 (2010); Lam v. Comm’r, 99 T.C.M. 2010-82 (2010).
115. See infra Part III(B).
116. See Surprising Experts, supra note 3 (“Such mistakes happen all the time, and they are easy
to make. We’re likely to see more of these cases.”).
117. Olsen v. Comm’r, T.C. Summ.Op. 2011-131, 7 (2011).
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the Code provides that “[n]o penalty shall be imposed . . . with respect
to any portion of an underpayment if it is shown that there was a
reasonable cause for such portion and that the taxpayer acted in good
faith with respect to such portion.”118 The most important factor in
determining whether the exception applies is the extent of the taxpayer’s
effort to properly assess his or her tax liability.119 The Tax Court
determined that Olsen “did not bury his head in the sand and ignore his
obligation to check the accuracy of his tax return,” and instead found
that he made his best effort to assess his tax liability.120
The Tax Court could have relied on the reasonable cause/good faith
exception without any reference to Olsen’s TurboTax Defense. In fact,
the summary opinion appears to turn completely on the exception. It
would not be incongruous with other areas of tax jurisprudence that
allow a taxpayer to escape extra liabilities beyond the taxes incurred
based solely on the taxpayer’s good faith.
For instance, other areas of tax law have carved out exceptions based
on the taxpayer’s good faith. Criminal tax law is one example.
Criminal provisions of the Code provide that a taxpayer must “willfully”
evade his or her taxes to be liable.121 In response, the Supreme Court
has defined “willfulness” through a series of opinions,122 and has
ultimately reached the conclusion that the standard is “voluntary,
intentional violation of a known legal duty.”123
Section 7201 of the Code provides that “[a]ny person who willfully
attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any tax imposed . . . or the
payment thereof” is guilty of a felony.124 Likewise, § 7203 requires that

118. I.R.C. § 6664(c)(1) (2012).
119. Olsen, T.C. Summ.Op. at 4.
120. Id. at 7. The Tax Court found that Olsen’s efforts were extensive, including upgrading his
tax preparation software to a more sophisticated version, correctly identifying the trust as the source of
the income, correctly entering the trust’s tax identification number, and reviewing the information he
entered. Id. at 6–7. “Despite his best efforts, however, [Olsen] failed to discover that the amount of the
interest income did not appear on the final version of his tax return that was filed.” Id. at 7.
121. See I.R.C. § 7201 (2012) (requiring a taxpayer to willfully evade or defeat taxes imposed in
order to be guilty of a felony); I.R.C. § 7203 (2012) (requiring a taxpayer to willfully fail to file a tax
return to be guilty of a misdemeanor).
122. See, e.g., Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 201 (1991) (“[T]he standard for the statutory
willfulness requirement is the ‘voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty.’”); United States
v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 346, 360 (1973) (“The Court, in fact has recognized that the word ‘willfully’ in
these statutes generally connotes a voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty. It has
formulated the requirement of willfulness as ‘bad faith or evil intent’”); United States v. Murdock, 290
U.S. 389, 394–95 (1933) (“[W]hen used in a criminal statute, [willfully] generally means an act done
with a bad purpose . . . This court has held that, where directions as to the method of conducting a
business are embodied in a revenue act to prevent loss of taxes, and the act declares a willful failure to
observe the directions a penal offense, an evil motive is a constituent element of the crime.”).
123. Cheek, 498 U.S. at 201.
124. I.R.C. § 7201 (2012) (emphasis added).
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“[a]ny person required . . . to make a return . . . who willfully fails
to . . . make such return” is guilty of a misdemeanor.125 Therefore,
determining the meaning of “willfulness” has been important in shaping
criminal liability of taxpayers.
In 1991, the Supreme Court decided a case that turned on the meaning
of the word “willfully” as used in the Code.126 In Cheek, the taxpayer
had been found guilty of six counts of willfully failing to file a federal
income tax return and three counts of willfully attempting to evade his
income taxes.127 Cheek stopped paying his income taxes once he began
attending seminars sponsored by a group of individuals who advocated
that the federal tax system is unconstitutional.128 Some of the speakers
were attorneys who purported to give professional opinions.129 Cheek,
therefore, admitted that he did not pay his taxes for the six years in
question, but defended his conduct on his sincere belief that the tax laws
were being unconstitutionally enforced—essentially, that he had acted
without the willfulness required for criminal liability.130
The Court agreed that Cheek had not acted with the required
willfulness, and noted that his good-faith belief did not have to be
objectively reasonable.131 In reaching this conclusion, the Court
described the evolution from the strict common law rule, which held that
ignorance of the law is no defense to criminal prosecution, to the
creation of the applicable exception, that specific intent is required for
the action to be willful in the criminal tax context.132 Criminal tax
offenses, the Court noted, are afforded this special treatment “largely
due to the complexity of the tax laws.”133
Therefore, for the government to prove the willfulness of a
defendant’s actions, it must show “that the law imposed a duty on the
defendant, that the defendant knew of this duty, and that he voluntarily
and intentionally violated that duty.”134 If the government can
demonstrate that the defendant had actual knowledge, then the
knowledge component is satisfied unless the defendant “had a goodfaith belief that he was not violating any of the provisions of the tax
laws.”135 This belief, known as the good-faith defense, has heightened
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

I.R.C. § 7203 (2012) (emphasis added).
Cheek, 498 U.S. at 194.
Id. at 194, 198.
Id. at 195–96.
Id. at 196.
Id.
Id. at 203.
Id. at 199–200.
Id. at 200.
Id. at 201.
Id. at 202.
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the standard of knowledge for a taxpayer facing criminal charges for tax
liability.
Given the willingness of tax jurisprudence to make exceptions for
taxpayers who can demonstrate that their tax errors or evasions stem
from a good-faith error, framing the analysis solely in terms of good
faith could have been an appropriate course of action. The Tax Court
could have ignored the TurboTax Defense and focused solely on the
§ 6664(c)(1) exception. The exception would have disposed of the issue
and justified finding no accuracy-related penalties. The Tax Court
reasoned that an isolated transcription error is not inconsistent with a
finding of reasonable cause and good faith,136 consistent with the
Treasury regulations,137 and that was as far as the analysis needed to go.
2. Professional Advice Exception
Perhaps the Tax Court did not rely solely on the exception carved out
in § 6664(c)(1) because the exception is often used in conjunction with
specific circumstances. Instead, the Tax Court could have also relied on
the professional advice exception. If a taxpayer can demonstrate that he
relied on the advice of a professional, and that such reliance was
reasonable and in good faith, then he may be able to invoke the good
faith exception of § 6664(c)(1). The professional advice exception,
although not currently accepted as encompassing the TurboTax Defense,
could be a viable alternative for the Tax Court to avoid penalizing
taxpayers for mistakes it deems to be made in good faith.
In some of the cases where the Tax Court rejected the TurboTax
Defense, it also addressed the professional advice exception.138
However, the Tax Court’s treatment of the issue was inconsistent. In
one case, the Tax Court treated TurboTax as the professional but found
that the professional advice exception was inapplicable because “[t]ax
preparation software, like TurboTax, is only as good as the information
one inputs into it.”139 In another, the Tax Court found that TurboTax
was not a professional preparer and that the professional advice

136. Olsen v. Comm’r, T.C. Summ.Op. 2011-131, 5–6 (2011).
137. The Treasury regulations provide that“[a]n isolated computational or transcriptional error
generally is not inconsistent with reasonable cause and good faith.” Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(b)(1)
(2012).
138. See Parker v. Comm’r, T.C. Summ.Op. 2010-78, 5 (2010) (“Reliance on the advice of a
professional does not necessarily demonstrate reasonable cause and good faith unless . . . such reliance
was reasonable and the taxpayer acted in good faith.”); Lam v. Comm’r, 99 T.C.M. 2010-82, 3 (2010)
(“[R]eliance upon the advice of a tax professional may establish . . . reasonable cause and good faith for
the purposes of avoiding a section 6662(a) penalty.”).
139. Parker, T.C. Summ.Op. at 5 (internal quotations omitted).
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exception could not, therefore, be reached.140 Despite this inconsistent
treatment of the professional advice exception as it applies to the
TurboTax Defense, the exception could be an acceptable way to dispose
of taxpayer penalties when the taxpayer has reasonably relied on tax
preparation software.
Treasury Regulation § 1.6664-4 details when the good faith exception
of § 6664(c)(1) of the Code applies due to reliance on professional
advice.141
The
regulation
defines
advice
as
“any
communication . . . setting forth the analysis or conclusion of a person,
other than the taxpayer, provided to (or for the benefit of) the taxpayer
and on which the taxpayer relies.”142 Advice does not have to be in any
particular form, but it must be based on all pertinent facts and
circumstances and must not be based on unreasonable factual or legal
assumptions.143 A taxpayer’s reliance on the advice of a professional
must be objectively reasonable.144 Advice is only objective if the
taxpayer has provided the professional with information that is both
necessary and accurate.145
The Tax Court could have embraced the TurboTax Defense within
the professional advice exception, thereby avoiding further expansion
and complication of tax jurisprudence. The regulation does not dictate
the form of advice, only that it must be a communication that analyzes a
taxpayer’s situation upon which the taxpayer relies.146 In Olsen, the Tax
Court found that Olsen “acted reasonably in upgrading his tax
preparation software to a more sophisticated version” so that he could
properly report the unfamiliar income.147 The Tax Court could have
found that the tax preparation software constituted professional advice,
seeing as it is software designed specifically for the purpose of
providing accurate tax services to customers with personalized tax
advice.148 Bolstering this approach is the fact that Olsen exercised an
option to upgrade his TurboTax software for more sophisticated tax
inquiries.149
Further, the regulations require that the taxpayer’s reliance be
140. Lam, T.C.M. at 3 (discussing the contours of the professional advice exception and then
holding that the taxpayer “did not rely on a professional preparer, but used TurboTax and stipulated to
preparing her own returns without a tax professional”).
141. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(c) (2012).
142. Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(c)(2).
143. Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(c)(1)(i)&(c)(2).
144. See, e.g., Parker, T.C. Summ.Op. at 5.
145. Id.
146. Treas. Reg. § 1.6664(c)(2).
147. Olsen v. Comm’r, T.C. Summ.Op. 2011-131, 6 (2011).
148. See, e.g., TURBOTAX, http://turbotax.intuit.com/ (last visited Oct. 28, 2012).
149. Olsen, T.C. Summ.Op. at 3.
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objective, which requires the taxpayer to accurately provide the
professional with all pertinent facts.150 The Tax Court found that Olsen
had correctly identified the source of income and the identification
number in the software,151 which would be objective evidence that he
had given the tax professional, TurboTax, the pertinent facts. Olsen’s
isolated transcription error is where the calculation went awry,152 which
arguably would not have affected his objectively reasonable reliance on
the software.
3. Impose Accuracy-Related Penalties
The reasonable cause exception for excusing accuracy-related
penalties requires a showing “that there was a reasonable cause for [the
underpayment] and that the taxpayer acted in good faith with respect to
[it].”153 Courts determine this case-by-case, taking into account all
pertinent facts and circumstances and, most importantly, the extent of
the taxpayer’s effort to assess his proper liability.154 “Circumstances
that may indicate reasonable cause and good faith include an honest
misunderstanding of fact or law that is reasonable in light of all the facts
and circumstances, including the experience, knowledge, and education
of the taxpayer.”155
In the previous decisions confronting the TurboTax Defense, the Tax
Court found that the reasonable cause exception was inapplicable. In
Lam v. Commissioner, the Tax Court refused to exercise the exception
because the taxpayer did not behave “in a manner consistent with that of
a prudent person” and “did not consult a tax professional or visit the IRS
website for instructions on filing.”156 The Court further held that it did
“not accept [the taxpayer’s] misuse of TurboTax, even if unintentional
or accidental, as a defense to the penalties” and that the underpayments
were a result of the taxpayer’s own negligence.157
The Tax Court also refused to excuse the accuracy-related penalties
assessed in Anyika v. Commissioner.158 It noted that the taxpayers did
not provide any evidence showing that the software was at fault and
further noted that “software is only as good as the information the

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(c)(1)(i) (2012); Parker, T.C. Summ.Op. at 5.
Olsen, T.C. Summ.Op. at 6–7 (2011).
Id. at 6.
I.R.C. § 6664(c)(1) (2012).
Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(b).
Id.
Lam v. Comm’r, 99 T.C.M. 2010-82, 3 (2010).
Id.
Anyika v. Comm’r, 101 T.C.M. 2011-69, 6 (2011).
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taxpayer puts into it,” reiterating the finding in Lam that “the misuse of
tax preparation software, even if unintentional or accidental, is no
defense to penalties.”159 The Tax Court held that a reasonable person in
the Anyikas’ position would have understood that the tax law governing
this particular issue was complex and would have then consulted a tax
professional instead of making assumptions.160
Finally, in Parker v. Commissioner, the Tax Court would not excuse
accuracy-related penalties because the taxpayer was aware of his tax
responsibilities and because he either knew, or should have known by
reviewing his returns, that he had not properly reported his tax
responsibilities.161 The Tax Court also rejected the taxpayer’s reliance
on unidentified TurboTax experts with whom he had consulted while
preparing his returns.162
Given the reasoning previously employed by the Tax Court when
confronted with the TurboTax Defense to accuracy-related penalties, it
would have been proper, and even expected, for the Olsen Court to
impose the accuracy-related penalties. Following precedent, the Tax
Court should have found that Olsen did not act reasonably and in good
faith in reporting his income. Following the reasoning in Lam, the Tax
Court should have found that Olsen was unreasonable in that he neither
consulted a tax professional nor the IRS website to determine how to
properly report income with which he was unfamiliar.163 As in Anyika,
the Tax Court should have found that Olsen should have known that the
tax law was complex when he was confronted with a type of income to
which he had never been exposed,164 and, if he had been a reasonable
person, he would have consulted a tax professional instead of assuming
that he could figure it out just by upgrading his software. As in Parker,
the Tax Court should have found that Olsen knew or reasonably would
have known he had made an error when the amount of the particular
income at question did not appear on the final version of his tax
return.165
Finally, a reading of the Code and Treasury regulations would also
substantiate a finding that imposition of accuracy-related penalties was
warranted in Olsen.166 The regulations require the Tax Court to take
159. Id.
160. Id. at 5.
161. Parker v. Comm’r, T.C. Summ.Op. 2010-78, 7 (2010).
162. Id. at 6.
163. Olsen, T.C. Summ.Op. at 2 (Olsen’s “wife received a Schedule K-1 . . . Prior to this instance,
the couple had never received a Schedule K-1 and were unfamiliar with the form”).
164. See id.
165. Id. at 7 (“Despite his best efforts, however, [Olsen] failed to discover that the amount of the
interest income did not appear on the final version of his tax return that was filed.”).
166. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4 (2012).
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into account the experience, knowledge, and education of the
taxpayer.167 Olsen admittedly had no experience with the particular
income he failed to report properly.168 However, Olsen was a highly
educated patent attorney for the government,169 which, as pointed out by
some observers,170 should have motivated him to seek professional
advice. Olsen was someone who should have understood that dealing
with government forms is highly complex and requires specialized
knowledge. Therefore, the Tax Court should have found that it was
unreasonable for Olsen to not seek professional tax advice, or to at least
search the IRS website for advice on how to properly report this
unfamiliar income.
V. CONCLUSION
The seemingly innocuous Olsen summary opinion sparked
controversy in allowing the TurboTax Defense, and for good reason.
The Tax Court’s decision to abandon precedent cut directly against the
Tax Court’s previous findings that the TurboTax Defense was
meritless171 and opened the floodgates for even more taxpayers to claim
that return errors are the fault of tax preparation software.172
The Tax Court’s decision was also flawed in that it was based on bad
facts—facts that did not properly fit the TurboTax Defense.173 Further,
if the Tax Court was determined to find that Olsen was not liable for
accuracy-related penalties, it had other alternatives that would reach the
same result without expanding tax jurisprudence.174 Or, the Tax Court
should have followed precedent, as was expected by the tax community,
and found that Olsen was liable for accuracy-related penalties based on
his own inexcusable error.175
After exploring the contours of the statutory and case law behind the
Olsen decision, the question remains: Why even allow the TurboTax
Defense? This is a question that is expected to be debated in the years
to come, as the use of tax preparation software continues to be a popular

167. Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(b).
168. Olsen v. Comm’r, T.C. Summ.Op. 2011-131, 3 (2011).
169. Id. at 2.
170. See, e.g., Tax Court Rules in Favor, supra note 88 (“Did Mr. Olsen ever think of hiring a
professional knowledgeable in the preparation of income tax returns? What would he think of a novice
trying to defend a patent matter?”).
171. See infra Part II(B).
172. See Surprising Experts, supra note 3 (“Such mistakes happen all the time, and they are easy
to make. We’re likely to see more of these cases.”).
173. See infra Part IV(A)(1).
174. See infra Part IV(B)(1–2).
175. See infra Part IV(B)(3).
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alternative to seeking advice from a certified tax professional.
Therefore, the Tax Court should be wary of its future decisions, and
consider just how “reasonable”176 it is for a taxpayer to underpay on his
tax liabilities when relying on tax preparation software, software which
“is only as good as the information one inputs into it.”177

176. I.R.C. § 6664(c) (2012). The Tax Court will not impose an accuracy-related penalty “if it is
shown that there was a reasonable cause for such portion and that the taxpayer acted in good faith with
respect to such portion.” I.R.C. § 6664(c)(1) (2012).
177. Parker v. Comm’r, T.C. Summ.Op. 2010-78, 5 (2010).
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